Introduction
A large literature has attempted to determine whether art could provide an interesting investment opportunity 1 . Even though according to a former director of the MOMA up to 40% of the high end art market consists of forged art (Thompson, 2008, p. 220) , the impact of fakes and copies on the art market has only been assessed in an indirect way. In most hedonic regressions, authenticity dummies carry positive signs whereas indications that the artworks are not from the master himself carry negative signs. According to Renneboog and Spaenjers (2009) "whenever an attribution dummy comes into play, the average price level drops by more than 50%". Once fakes are discovered they are usually immediately removed from the market. If there are doubts about a painting's originality, but no legal proofs of its fake nature, it might be sold but at a severe discount. The impact of the discovery on the forged paintings' fate is thus straightforward but its influence on other paintings from the copied artist remains unknown. This paper analyzes whether:
o Prior to their discovery, paintings of a copied artist (whether fake or not) are more likely to be sold in a major auction houses or not.
o The likelihood to sell one of these paintings is directly affected by the fakes' discovery.
o Prices of these paintings react before (and after) it is made public that fakes have been discovered
In other words, the paper aims at understanding the overall impact that the existence and the discovery of say, a fake Gauguin, has (or has had) on the market for Gauguin's artworks.
Data and methodology
The database consists of all mentions of fake discoveries 2 for which the fraudulent character of the painting has been clearly established by a judge or a criminal investigation. The "fake" is considered discovered on the date when it is first mentioned in the press. Three leading sources are , and a provenance variable equal to the sum of the number of sources cited for authentication in the sale's catalogue and the number of past exhibitions. Since unsold paintings represent a fair share of our data they should not be discarded. We follow Collins et al. (2009) who suggest using a sample selection procedure 7 to include these in our analysis.
There is no way to a priori assess the timing of the impact of the fake discovery. However, it is reasonable to assume that some people are aware of the existence of an ongoing investigation before it is made public. There may thus be an impact before the official announcement. Since auctions are not held on a continuous basis, the impact may take a lag to materialize. To take these elements into account, we construct a 180-days dummy variable taking the value of 1, if the date is comprised in the 180 days window and zero otherwise. For all regressions, we then use a sliding window approach:
that is we run the regressions 720 times, beginning 360 days before the discovery, and sliding day by day to 360 days 8 after the case. ,..., 1 ) (
Where Y is a dependent variable, (.) g is the regression function (in our case, either a probit, 
Results and Discussion
When fakes are known to exist sellers may consider using alternative channels to sell their paintings. Going through one of the two main auction houses may be used as a way to signal to the market that their painting is genuine. On the other hand, owner of fakes may wish to avoid the screening of the two main houses and sell their paintings through lesser known auction houses 10 .
Buyers may consider that the two main auction houses have a better procedure to assess the originality of the artwork and may thus be less likely to let a fake get to the market. Also, the larger the auction house, the lower the likelihood of default on the guarantee. If the two main auction houses are indeed perceived as providing a better screening service, then one would expect more artworks to be sold through minor auction houses before the fakes are exposed.
9 Full regression results are available upon request. 10 The main auction houses have a bigger incentive to act diligently. They have a reputation to preserve and they would have to pay the guarantee if they let a fake get through. Smaller auction houses have a less well established reputation and some of them might know that in case of problem they will anyways be unable to service the guarantee.
To test this hypothesis, a probit model is used with as dependant variable a dummy variable equal to 1 if a given artwork is sold through Christie's or Sotheby's and zero otherwise. Figure 1 reports the p-values and the coefficients for the sliding windows dummy ( i β ). The coefficients' values are reported on the y Axis, the x Axis represents the first days of the sliding windows, the p-values are
given by a color code. Results confirm the hypothesis: the likelihood that an artwork be sold via one of the two main auction houses is actually lower during the period preceding the fakes' discoveries (as testified by the negative sign for the first windows). Unsurprisingly, the reverse is found up to one year after publications mention the existence of fakes (as shown by the positive sign for the windows starting after the announcement). The discovery of fakes may also play a role regarding prices and the ability to sell a painting.
We run a probit model, with as dependant variable the sold/unsold dummy to assess the impact of fake discoveries on the probability to sell a painting. Surprisingly, the results (not reported) show that fake discoveries have almost no impact on the probability to sell an artwork. The likelihood to sell depends obviously on the price asked. Paintings may be easier to sell after fakes have been discovered if their price is much lower. In order to determine fakes' impact on prices, we run a sample selection estimation with the logarithm of the price as the outcome equation's dependant variable. Prior to the fakes' discoveries, coefficients tend to be positive. They are significant at the 5% level for the windows starting between dates -282 to -237, which might indicate that price increases lead more forgers to enter the market. Prices do not directly react when the existence of fakes is made public. The first negative coefficient appears for a window starting 136 days after the discovery. This might be due to sellers' willingness to postpone the sales following the news that fakes may come to the market. It seems quite reasonable to assume that in many cases sales cannot be postponed indefinitely. Some sellers are then forced to take the risk of a lower price. In this case, the lagged impact makes perfect sense. Eventually, close to a year after fakes have been made public, prices increase indicating that buyers view the market as purged.
